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Constitutional Rights in Prison: The
Standard of Review in California
The rights retained by prison inmates as well as the judicial role
in interpreting those rights have developed significantly in recent years.
The traditional approach of the courts in interpreting the rights of
inmates, termed the "civil death" doctrine, entirely suspended the
civil rights of the imprisoned.' The civil death doctrine was codified
in California Penal Code section 2600.2 Statutory rights, however,
were given to state prisoners in 1975 following the repeal of the civil
death doctrine and the subsequent reenactment of California Penal
Code section 2600.1 The present version of section 2600 provides that
prisoners retain those rights that are not inconsistent with their status
as prisoners.' The amended provision does not limit application to
civil rights, but considers rights in general.' This change in terminology
from "civil rights" to "rights" has been interpreted by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court to include all the rights of free persons.'
Prisoners have encountered substantial difficulty enforcing constitu-
tional rights. As discussed above,7 constitutional rights are included
in those rights protected by Penal Code section 2600. Although con-
stitutional rights are in addition to statutory rights, the reenactment
of Penal Code section 2600 in practice offered prisoners greater pro-
tection of their constitutional rights.'
As late as 1962, the United States Supreme Court refused to ex-
tend fourth amendment protections to prisoners.9 Katz v. United
States,'0 a watershed case involving the right to privacy, opened the
door to application of the fourth amendment to claims brought by
prisoners by holding that the fourth amendment protects persons not
places." For the most part, courts have been unsuccessful in apply-
1. 1968 Cal. Stat. c. 1402, §1, at 2763 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §2600); repealed
by 1975 Cal. Stat. c. 1175, §3, at 2897.
2. Id.
3. CAL. PENAL CODE §2600.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. DeLancie v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 865, 868, 647 P.2d 142, 143, 183 Cal. Rptr.
866, 867 (1982).
7. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
9. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962).
10. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
11. Id. at 351.
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ing Katz when a right to privacy claim is brought by a prisoner. 2
Courts have ruled that prisoners do not have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in prison.' 3 This determination effectively precludes
a prisoner from prevailing in a cause of action based upon a viola-
tion of the right to privacy.
The nature of prisoner rights remains uncertain due to conflict regar-
ding the proper scope of judicial review of decisions made by prison
officials. Recently, California correctional officials have proposed in-
stallation of sound monitoring devices in the chapels of California
Youth Authority facilities."' This action borders on an impermissible
infringement of a prisoner's constitutional rights. Traditionally, courts
have deferred to administrative findings and judgments when faced
with prisoner complaints." Moreover, the judiciary exercised a policy
of abstention that has been termed the "hands-off" approach.16 This
approach calls for a minimal level of review by the court. I Advocates
of the hands-off approach believe that the judiciary is not competent
to review prison administrative decisions.' 8 Rather, the proper course
for courts, according to this. approach, is to give great deference to
officials who are experts in the correctional field.' 9 Application of
the hands-off approach to prison cases prevented review by the court
and led to the validation of virtually all correctional regulations.20
Although many courts have begun to engage in a more active analysis, 2'
several courts continue to defer to prison authorities.22 In the case
of In re Arias,23 the installation of sound monitoring devices in prison
chapels has been challenged and upheld by the California Third District
Court of Appeals. The propriety of that judgment has been ques-
tioned in regard to both the nature of the rights retained by prisoners
12. Hudson v. Palmer, 52 U.S.L.W. 5052, 5054 (1984). But see North v. Superior Court,
8 Cal. 3d 301, 311, 502 P.2d 1305, 1311, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 839 (1972).
13. Hudson v. Palmer, 52 U.S.L.W. 5052, 5054 (1984).
14. In re Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d 804, 808, 206 Cal. Rptr. 806, 808 (1984).
15. See infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
16. For a complete discussion of the "hands-off" doctrine see Note, Beyond The Ken
Of The Courts: A Critique Of Judicial Refusal To Review The Complaints Of Convicts, 72
YALE L.J. 506, 515-26 (1963).
17. Id. at 507-08.
18. Id. at 508-09.
19. In re Jordan, 7 Cal. 3d 930, 934, 500 P.2d 873, 875, 103 Cal. Rptr. 849, 851 (1972).
20. See Note, supra note 16, at 506-09, 528-29; see also J. CHOPER, Y. KAImsAR & L.
TRIBE, Tim SuPRmE CouRT: TRENDs AND DEVELOPMENTS 2 (1983).
21. Comment, Prison Mail Censorship: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 23 HASTINGs L.J.
995, 1000-01 (1972).
22. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979); see infra notes 163-69 and accom-
panying text.
23. 160 Cal. App. 3d 804, 206 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1984).
24. Id. at 814-15, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
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and the proper role of the court in determining those rights. 25
The purpose of this comment is to review the development of
prisoner rights and the role of the judiciary in the analysis and en-
forcement of those rights. Arias will be discussed to illustrate the con-
fusion courts have experienced in reconciling the role of the judiciary
in interpreting and protecting constitutional rights with the role of
prison officials in maintaining institutional security. This confusion
has prevented California courts from adhering to a uniform standard
for reviewing prisoner complaints. Since the validity of any regula-
tion is a function of the level of judicial review under which the regula-
tion is analyzed,26 the scope of rights retained by prisoners and the
proper role of the court in determining those rights are inextricably
intertwined. In deciding the scope of prisoner rights, the court must
determine the nature of the alleged right. The court then can deter-
mine the extent to which the retained rights may be infringed upon
in the interest of institutional security. This author proposes that once
fundamental constitutional rights have been implicated, the court
should use a least restrictive means test27 to decide the validity of
the disputed prison regulation. To provide a framework for the analysis
and proposal, the facts of Arias will be discussed first.
In Re Arias: FACTUAL BACKDROP
In re Arias2s presents a recent example of the problems courts face
in determining the extent of constitutional rights retained by prisoners. 29
Arias additionally poses the question of the proper role of the court
in reviewing correctional regulations that impact upon those prisoner
rights.3" The court in Arias examined the constitutionality of install-
ing an electronic sound monitoring security system in the chapel of
a juvenile detention center run by the California Youth Authority
(CYA). The petitioner claimed that installation of the system would
violate rights of both freedom of religious expression and privacy. 32
As proposed, the monitoring system was to operate throughout the
prison, but Arias only challenged the use of the system in the chapel.33
25. The California Supreme Court, on January 22, 1985, granted petitioners rehearing.
26. L. Tribe, AMIsCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1000 (1978).
27. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
28. 160 Cal. App. 3d 804, 206 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1984).
29. Id. at 808, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
30. Id. at 808-09, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
31. Id. at 808, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 808-09, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
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The CYA intended to place a single microphone in the chapel.34 The
chapel consisted of three rooms, a vestibule, a sanctuary, and a
chaplain's office." The microphone was to be located in the vestibule3 6
and was designed to enable security personnel in the control center to
monitor sound in the vestibule and in the sanctuary when the doors
between the two rooms were open.37
Although capable of being used as an information gathering device,
the sound monitoring system was intended to function primarily as
an alarm system.38 As an alarm, the system would be activated if
a preselected decibel level was reached.39 The decibel level could be
adjusted at the control center to accommodate the noise level nor-
mally accompanying the particular activity taking place in the chapel
at any given time. 0 Whenever the actual noise level exceeded the
preselected decibel level, a warning light would activate in the con-
trol center.4 If the warning signal persisted, or recurred within a short
period of time, a microphone would be activated allowing security
personnel to hear sounds within range of the microphone. 2
The system left important operational aspects to the discretion of
control center personnel. For example, no guidelines were promulgated
to determine how often the decibel level would be adjusted in response
to changing activities. Additionally, the question of who would decide,
and on what criteria, to turn the microphone off in response to the
chaplain's request was unclear.
The California Court of Appeal held that the interest of the prison
administration in maintaining institutional security was a proper
penological objective. "3 The proper role of the court, according to
Arias, was to defer to the expert judgment of the CYA authorities
in the absence of substantial evidence that the judgment was
unreasonable.44 Although the court held that the petitioner's constitu-
tional rights may have been violated, any violation was deemed to
be reasonable in light of the petitioner's status as a prisoner.43 The
34. Id. at 808, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
35. Id.
36. Vestibule is defined as a chamber between the outer door and the interior of a building.
WEBSTER'S THImD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2547 (1976).
37. Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 808, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 808, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 808-09.
41. Id. at 808, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 811, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
44. Id. at 811, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
45. Id. at 812, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
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court concluded that correctional officials were not unreasonable in
judging that the sound system was necessary to maintain institutional
security." The standard of review applied by the court in Arias,
however, is inconsistent with the weight of California authority. "7 When
deciding issues involving possible violations of constitutional rights,
California courts should not routinely defer to the judgment of prison
officials. Rather, courts should conduct an independent inquiry and
require strong state interests and close relationships between the goals
sought and the means employed." Although prison officials have
statutory authority to infringe upon the constitutional rights of in-
mates, this authority only protects infringements to the extent they
are necessary to promote institutional security.4 9
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS RETAINED BY PRISONERS
Persons confined in correctional institutions do not forfeit all con-
stitutional protections.5 Although prisoners retain both state and
federal constitutional rights, these rights are subject to limitations con-
sistent with their status as inmates.5 The extent of protection offered
by the California Constitution differs from that offered by the United
States Constitution. 2 Petitioners in Arias brought suit charging that
their state and federal rights to both freedom of religious expression
and privacy were being violated. 3
A. Right to Religious Freedom
Prisoners are entitled to exercise their religious beliefs freely under
the guarantees of the first and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution. 4 Section 1705 of the California Welfare and In-
stitutions Code specifically extends reasonable opportunities to exer-
cise religious freedom to those in CYA custody." Still, the needs of
the institution, particularly the need to preserve institutional security,
must be balanced against the rights of the individual prisoner.16
46. Id.
47. See infra notes 233-45 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 199-210 and accompanying text.
49. CAL. PENAL CODE §2600; see infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
50. Bell, 441 U.S. at 545.
51. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
52. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
53. Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 808-09, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
54. Id. at 809 n.2, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 809 n.2. The right to free exercise of religion is
also guaranteed by CAL. CONST., art. I, §4. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV with CAL.
CONsT. art. I, §4.
55. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §1705.
56. Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
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A prisoner does not have the absolute right to practice religion in
any chosen manner.57 Prison officials may not deny completely the
right to preach or disseminate religious views." Prisoners may not
be denied access to spiritual leaders.5 9 The prison administration,
however, may regulate a prisoner's exercise of religion to promote
institutional security without unduly infringing upon the protected
freedom.6
Prisoner claims of violations of religious rights primarily have been
upheld When prison officials have completely prohibited certain aspects
of religious exercise.6' In situations in which regulations of prison
officials merely infringe upon these rights, the prison administration
is required to show that the ban is reasonably necessary to promote
a compelling state interest.62 The orderly administration of a prison
population is indisputably a compelling state interest. 63 Thus, in the
absence of a complete ban, prisoners will have a difficult task over-
coming the state's showing of a compelling state interest." The in-
fringements on religious expression also implicate the constitutional right
to privacy.
B. The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy is guaranteed under both the United States
and California Constitutions.65 The California Constitution affords
greater protection for the individual right of privacy than the federal
counterpart.6" Private communications within a religious chapel or with
a religious advisor are included in the right to privacy. 67
1. Right to Privacy Under the United States Constitution
Although the right to privacy is not specifically enumerated in the
United States Constitution, courts long have recognized that the right
57. Jihaad v. O'Brien, 645 F.2d 556, 564 (6th Cir. 1981).
58. Lipp v. Procunier, 395 F. Supp. 871, 875, supplemented by 402 F. Supp. 623 (N.D.
Cal. 1975).
59. Lipp, 395 F. Supp. at 875.
60. Id. 0
61. Jihaad, 645 F.2d at 564.
62. Lipp, 395 F. Supp. at 877.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. CAL. CONST. art. I, §1; see infra notes 68-74, 97-100 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 839, 841 (1976).
67. See, e.g., White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 774, 533 P.2d 222, 233, 120 Cal. Rptr.
94, 105 (1975).
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to privacy is a fundamental right.68 In Griswold v. Connecticut,69 the
United States Supreme Court held that a constitutionally protected right
to privacy exists, emanating from certain provisions of the Bill of
Rights. 0 Griswold reviewed the conviction of a doctor under a Con-
necticut statute which prohibited counselling on contraception." The
Court stated that decisions regarding contraception were within a zone
of privacy created by the penumbra of specific guarantees in the Bill
of Rights.72 The cases following Griswold that addressed family deci-
sions based the right to privacy upon the liberty concept of the four-
teenth amendment." Other cases have based the right to privacy upon
the fourth amendment.74
The fourth amendment protects individuals against certain govern-
mental intrusions. 75 Traditionally, to bring a successful claim of a
violation of the right to privacy under the fourth amendment, the
petitioner had to show the intrusion related to a constitutionally pro-
tected area.76 Fourth amendment protection usually was limited to
private property.77 Additionally, courts held that surveillance without
any trespass was outside the reach of the fourth amendment. 8 In
Lanza v. New York, 9 the United States Supreme Court refused to
find a violation of the fourth amendment when petitioner alleged that
a private conversation between himself and his brother in a jail had
been intercepted electronically. 0 The Court held that a public jail was
not a protected area under the fourth amendment.' Until 1967, courts
continued to view the fourth amendment as a basis for protecting
specific places.
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court rejected the traditional
notion that only private property could be protected by the fourth
68. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
69. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
70. Id. at 484.
71. Id. at 480.
72. Id. at 485. "The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." Id.
73. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONs TsTUTONAL LAw 737-40 (2d ed. 1983).
74. 1 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIimAL PROCEDURE §3.2 (1984).
75. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
76. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962).
77. Id.
78. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
79. 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
80. Lanza, 370 U.S. at 143-45.
81. "But to say that a public jail is the equivalent of a man's 'house' or that it is a
place where he can claim constitutional immunity from search or seizure of his person, his
papers, or his effects is at best a novel argument." Id. at 143.
1083
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
amendment.82 In Katz v. United States,83 FBI agents placed electronic
eavesdropping equipment on the'outside of a public telephone booth
from which Katz conducted his business." The traditional applica-
tion of fourth amendment analysis would have provided Katz no relief
due to the fact that he made his phone calls on public property and
that FBI agents did not commit trespass by installing the device.8"
The Court pointed out that the fourth amendment protects persons
and not places."6 Justice Harlan, in a concurrence, stated a two-pronged
test for determining whether a person is entitled to fourth amend-
ment protection.87 Under the first prong of Harlan's test, the court
decides whether the person alleging the violation had an actual, sub-
jective expectation of privacy.8 8 Under the second prong, the court
decides whether society would recognize that expectation as
reasonable.89 Although the majority opinion does not contain the term
"expectation," subsequent decisions frequently have followed Harlan's
analysis as if the expectation requirement had been part of the ma-
jority opinion. 90
In Bell v. Wolfish,' the United States Supreme Court questioned
whether a prisoner ever could have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 92 Petitioners in Bell brought suit challenging numerous con-
ditions of confinement.93 The Supreme Court concluded that if a
prisoner could have a reasonable expectation of privacy, that expec-
tation would be of a vastly diminished scope in comparison to non-
confined persons. 94 In the most recent prisoner rights decision by the
Supreme Court, a prisoner was found to have no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in his prison cell.95 No cases, however, have address-
ed directly the question whether a prisoner has an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy in his prison chapel or whether society would
82. Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
83. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
84. Id. at 348.
85. Id. at 348-49.
86. Id. at 351.
87. Id. at 361.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MiNN. L. REv. 349, 384
(1974); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 52 U.S.L.W. 5052, 5054 (1984).
91. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
92. Id. at 557.
93. Petitioners challenged the practice of regulations requiring strip and body cavity searches
after contact visits, the practice of double bunking, and the rule that books could only be
sent to the prison by a publisher. Id. at 529-30.
94. Bell, 441 U.S. at 557.
95. Hudson, 52 U.S.L.W. at 5054.
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find such an expectation reasonable. Under the analysis of the United
States Supreme Court, prisoners have little chance of prevailing on
a claim against prison officials based upon the right to privacy. Califor-
nia courts, however, have allowed several exceptions to the require-
ment of finding a reasonable expectation of privacy. 96
2. The Right to Privacy in California
Unlike the United States Constitution, the California Constitution
specifically provides a right to privacy. 97 In 1972, California voters
amended article I, section 1 of the state constitution to include the
right to privacy among the various inalienable rights of all people. 9
This amendment was designed to respond to concerns that privacy
was not guaranteed by the original state constitution.9 Courts inter-
preting the amendment viewed the express addition as an expansion
of the right to privacy."10
Private communications within a religious chapel are impliedly in-
cluded within the right to privacy protected by article I, section 1
of the California Constitution.' The principal objectives of the amend-
ment were explained in the election brochure published by the state.'
As stated in the brochure, the right to privacy protects "our homes,
our families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our per-
sonalities, our freedom of communion, and our freedom to associate
with the people we choose."'0 3 Religious communication specifically
falls under the area of communion' 4 and, arguably, the areas of emo-
tions and expressions.' 5 Religious expression, therefore, is protected
by the constitutionally based right to privacy.
96. See infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
97. CAL. CONsT. art. I, §1.
98. Article I, section 1 as reworded by constitutional amendment in 1974 now reads: "All
people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoy-
ing and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing
and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy." CAL. CoNsT. art. I, §1; see also White, 13 Cal.
3d at 773, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
99. Porten, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 841-42.
100. Id.
101. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
102. White, 13 Cal. 3d at 774 n.11, 533 P.2d at 234 n.11, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106 n.11.
"California decisions long have recognized the propriety of resorting to such election brochure
arguments as an aid in construing legislative measures and constitutional amendments adopted
pursuant to a vote of the people." Id.
103. Id. at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
104. Communion is defined as "intimate... interchange of ideas and feelings especially deal-
ing with matters innermost and spiritual." WEBSTER's THID NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
460 (1976).
105. Emotion is defined as a state or expression of strong feeling. \VEBSTER's THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 742 (1976). Expression is defined as an indication or depiction of
mood or sentiment. Id. at 803.
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California courts have taken a more liberal approach than the United
States Supreme Court in analyzing a prisoner's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. Although California cases uniformly have held that
a prisoner ordinarily has no reasonable expectation of privacy while
in prison,'0 6 several exceptions exist. These exceptions focus upon the
special relationship, if any, between the parties to the
communication.'0 7
The California Evidence Code provides special protection for
penitent-clergy communications.0 8 Notwithstanding judicial recogni-
tion that official surveillance is a necessary part of prison life, courts
have held that the relationships endowed with particularized confiden-
tiality must continue to receive unceasing protection. 1 9 To deny that
prisoners could ever have a reasonable expectation of privacy would
be to deny them any cause of action based upon a privacy right."10
Under Harlan's two-pronged test, a finding of a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, both subjective and objective, is required.
Constitutional law clearly indicates that government activity which
even indirectly inhibits the exercise of protected activity may run afoul
of constitutional proscriptions."' Constitutional freedoms are protected
not only against frontal attack but also from being stifled by more
subtle governmental interference." 2 The rationale for this is that
governmental action which falls short of prohibiting a certain activi-
ty still may have a chilling effect on the exercise of that activity." 3
Therefore, petitioners need not allege a total deprivation of a con-
stitutionally protected right provided they do allege a significant im-
pairment of their ability to exercise that right."" In addition to con-
stitutional rights, prisoners also enjoy statutory protection.
C. Sections 2600 and 636 of the California Penal Code
California Penal Code section 2600 addresses the civil rights of
prisoners. "' Section 2600 provides that an incarcerated person may
106. North, 8 Cal. 3d at 311, 502 P.2d at 1311, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 839; People v. Lopez,
60 Cal. 2d 223, 248, 384 P.2d 16, 30, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424, 438 (1963); Halpin v. Superior Court,
6 Cal. 3d 885, 900 n.21, 495 P.2d 1295, 1305 n.21, 101 Cal. Rptr. 375, 385 n.21 (1972).
107. North, 8 Cal. 3d at 310, 502 P.2d at 1310-11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39.
108. CAL. Evn. CODE §917.
109. North, 8 Cal. 3d at 310, 502 P.2d at 1310, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
110. See DeLancie, 31 Cal. 3d at 876, 647 P.2d at 149, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
I11. White, 13 Cal. 3d at 761, 533 P.2d at 224, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
112. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972) (quoting Stewart, J., in City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960)).
113. See White, 13 Cal. 3d at 761, 533 P.2d at 224, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
114. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
115. CAL. PENAL CODE §2600.
1086
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be deprived of only those rights necessary to provide for the reasonable
security of the institution and for protection of the public.1 6 Califor-
nia courts have recognized that section 2600 does not grant absolute
rights."' The possession of any right by a prisoner must be balanced
against the legitimate concern of the prison administration in main-
taining institutional security." 8 Restrictions may not be arbitrary under
the guise of prison security;" 9 they must be necessary to effectuate
a permissible state interest. 2 ' The question of necessity is addressed
only after a finding that protected rights are implicated.2 '
The right to privacy is a protected right under section 2600.'22 The
Legislature intended to equate the rights of inmates to the rights of
non-inmates subject only to the needs of institutional security and
protection of the public. 23 Therefore, denying prisoners a reasonable
expectation of privacy in prison, if unnecessary for institutional security,
would thwart the legislative purpose.'24 In addition to the general pro-
tections of Penal Code section 2600, other statutes protect specific
rights.
The situation of eavesdropping on a communication between a
prisoner and his clergyman is addressed specifically in Penal Code
section 636.125 This section provides that any person who, without
permission, eavesdrops on any conversation between a prisoner and
his clergyman is guilty of a felony. 2 6 The California Supreme Court
116. Id.
117. These rights are not absolute because although they are retained by prisoners, these
rights may be infringed upon to promote institutional security. CAL. PENAL CODE §2600.
118. See, e.g., DeLancie, 31 Cal. 3d at 874 n.8, 647 P.2d at 147 n.8, 183 Cal. Rptr. at
871 n.8.
119. Id. at 874 n.9, 647 P.2d at 148 n.9, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 872 n.9.
120. In re Reynolds, 25 Cal. 3d 131, 134-35, 599 P.2d 86, 88, 157 Cal. Rptr. 892, 894
(1979). The prison did not allow prisoners to wear union buttons. Id. at 133, 599 P.2d at
87, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 893. The court held:
[Respondent] relies solely on the fact that for security reasons he has refused to
authorize the Prisoners Union as an inmate group. Yet he does not show that the
reasons for not authorizing the Union... apply to display of the button .... Therefore
the ban violates Penal Code section 2600, which, as we have seen, permits restric-
tions on rights only "as is necessary in order to provide for the reasonable security
of the institution. .. ."
Id. at 134-35, 599 P.2d at 88, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
121. See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
122. DeLancie, 31 Cal. 3d at 868, 647 P.2d at 143, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
123. Id. at 875-76, 647 P.2d at 149, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
124. DeLancie, 31 Cal. 3d at 876, 647 P.2d at 149, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
125. CAL. PENAL CODE §636.
126. California Penal Code section 636 provides in pertinent part:
Every person, who, without permission from all parties to the conversation, eavesdrops
on or records by means of an electronic or other device, a conversation, or any
portion thereof, between a person who is in the physical custody of a law enforce-
ment agency or other public officer, and such person's attorney, religious advisor,
or licensed physician, is guilty of a felony. . ..
Id.
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has held that section 636 provides a prisoner with protection indepen-
dent of section 2600.127 Section 636 thus codifies the notion that im-
prisonment does not result in the relinquishment of the right to private
religious communication. The sound monitoring system proposed in
Arias allowed control personnel to eavesdrop on communications within
the chapel but nevertheless was upheld.
D. The Holding in Arias
The petitioners in the Arias case asserted that their constitutional
and statutory rights to religious freedom and privacy were violated
by the installation of the sound surveillance system in the chapel.'28
The contention of the petitioners was that the installation of an elec-
tronic sound monitoring system would chill their religious expression.' 29
Several clergymen also stated that their ability to communicate effec-
tively in private with the prisoners would be impaired. 3 '
The Arias court held that the infringement, if any, was inconse-
quential and did not violate petitioner's constitutional right to religious
freedom.' 3 ' The court relied upon the fact that most activities con-
ducted in the chapel were communal in nature.'3 2 In discussing those
religious activities that are traditionally conducted in a private set-
ting, such as individual counselling and auricular confessions,' 3 the
court explained that the system protected these communications by
not picking up sounds from the chaplain's office when the door was
closed. 34 Consequently, the court stated that the petitioner did not
suffer an unconstitutional violation of his right to religious
expression.' 35
The court in Arias did not address the presumption of confiden-
tiality that surrounds all communications between a penitent and his
127. In re Jordan, 7 Cal. 3d 930, 937 n.3, 500 P.2d 873, 877 n.3, 103 Cal. Rptr. 849,
853 n.3 (1972).
128. Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 808-09, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
129. Id. at 810, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 810; see supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
130. Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 810. Testimony by several clergymen,
including the chaplain at the juvenile center where petitioners were incarcerated, indicated that
the surveillance system would seriously infringe upon their relationships with the inmates. Peti-
tioner's Reply at 8, In re Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d 804, 206 Cal. Rptr. 806. Other religious
leaders, however, testified that the system as designed would not inhibit religious expression
since protestant worship is traditionally a public function. Respondent's Order to Show Cause
at 34, In re Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 804, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
131. Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 812, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 811-12.
132. Id. at 810, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
133. Id. at 814, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 810, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
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clergyman.' 36 California evidentiary law provides that the burden of
proving that a communication was not made in confidence is on the
opponent of the claim of privilege.' 37 The statute addresses all com-
munications, not merely those communications that take place behind
closed doors.' 38 The court in Arias considered chapel communication
separately from office communication although no basis exists for
this distinction in the statute. 3 9 No evidence was offered by the cor-
rectional officials to rebut the presumption of confidentiality. The
communications, therefore, should have been deemed privileged' 0 and
installation of the sound surveillance system an intrusion upon privileg-
ed and constitutionally protected religious expression.' 4 ' Although the
court held that petitioner's right to religious freedom would not be
violated, the court did point out that these same facts implicated the
right to privacy.' 42
The petitioner in Arias asserted that his right to privacy would be
violated by the installation of the microphone in the chapel."' The
appellate court summarily dismissed the right to privacy challenge,
stating that the reasons for invading petitioner's privacy were both
obvious and easily established.' 4 Since the court found the system
to be reasonably necessary, installation did not constitute an imper-
missible violation of the petitioner's right to privacy."'
While acknowledging the existence of California Penal Code sec-
tions 636 and 2600, the Arias court held that the statutes did not
protect the petitioner from installation of the sound system.'4 6 Ac-
cording to the court, section 2600 merely requires that any infringe-
ment on protected rights be reasonable. ' The decision noted that
the inviolability of religious counselling was recognized by Penal Code
136. CAL. EVID. CODE §917 states:
Whenever a privilege is claimed on the ground that the matter sought to be disclosed
is a communication made in confidence in the course of the.. .clergyman-penitent... rela-
tionship, the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence and the
opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the
communication was not confidential.
Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 808-13, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 808-11; CAL. EVID. CODE §917.
140. Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 808-13, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 808-11.
141. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
142. Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d. at 813, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 813-14, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 814, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
147. Id.
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section 636,148 but concluded that correctional officials were not con-
stitutionally bound to exempt any area of the prison from
surveillance. , 9 The court gave great weight. to evidence that noise from
within the chaplain's office could not be detected by the microphone
in the sanctuary.' 50
The above discussion suggests that despite the outcome of the Arias
case, petitioner made a sufficient showing that constitutional rights
of religious freedom and privacy had been implicated by the CYA
surveillance system. As codified by section 2600, rights of prisoners
may be infringed upon to a certain extent.'"' The question thus
becomes whether the infringement is an impermissible violation of
petitioner's rights. Determination of this issue is a direct function of
the level of judicial review the court will employ.' 2 If the court merely
requires the prison officials to demonstrate that the proposed system
is reasonable, the court will defer to the judgment of prison ad-
ministrators on the validity of the system.' 3 In essence, the court
will return to the traditional hands-off approach with the result that
prison regulations rarely will be struck down.'1 4 If, however, the court
independently analyzes the regulation in light of both the interests
of the prisoner and the legitimate interests of the correctional facili-
ty, the petitioner will receive an unbiased judgment. The critical in-
quiry, then, is what role the judiciary must assume when fundamen-
tal constitutional rights have been implicated by prison regulations.
JUDIcIAL REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED RESTRICTIONS
The standard of judicial review in both state and federal courts'"
applicable when determining the constitutional rights of non-inmates
is strict scrutiny. '56 Applying the strict scrutiny standard, courts re-
quire that the challenged law be necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest.'17 The court must balance the governmental
interests involved against the rights of the individual involved.'58 The
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
152. L. TRIBE, AmERicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1000 (1978).
153. See, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. at 546-47.
154. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
155. J. NowvAN, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YoUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 416-22 (2d ed. 1983).
"These rights include the following: (5) the right to privacy. . . ." Id. at 418 n.3.
156. Id. at 418.
157. Id. at 418-19.
158. Id.
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regulation must be tailored narrowly so that the goal sought is pro-
moted in a way that infringes upon the fewest rights. 15 9 This policy
of demanding the most narrowly tailored regulation is referred to as
the least restrictive means test. 60 Although the least restrictive means
test is applied universally in non-inmate cases, the United States
Supreme Court in a recent case has refused to apply the least restric-
tive means test to a prisoner's claim.' 6 '
A. Judicial Review in the United State Supreme Court:
Bell v. Wolfish
In a recent United States Supreme Court case concerning the rights
of prisoners, petitioners brought suit charging that their due process
rights were violated by prison practices.'6 z The Court discussed the
critical role that the judiciary plays in balancing the constitutional
and statutory rights of inmates with the requirements of institutional
security and order.'63 Bell v. Wolfish"' adopted the hands-off ap-
proach to the review of prison regulations.' 65 The Court based the
holding in Bell upon three premises. First, courts owe great deference
to the expertise of prison administrators.' 6  Second, the burden of
establishing an impermissible violation is on the inmates who raise
.onstitutional challenges to prison restrictions.' 67 Third, courts will
interfere only when correctional officials are "conclusively shown to
be wrong." '61 The Court did not explain exactly what criteria deter-
mine wrongfulness. The Court stated only that no evidence was
presented to show that the officials exaggerated their response or that
the restriction was irrational. 6 9 This analysis represents a return to
the hands-off'70 approach.
The Court in Bell stressed that the prison must be permitted to
ensure security.' 7 ' Courts should not second-guess the opinions and
decisions of prison administrators who are better informed as to the
159. Id. at 873.
160. Id; see also id. at 418-19.
161. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
162. Id. at 523; see supra note 93.
163. Bell, 441 U.S. at 545-47.
164. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
165. Id. at 547-48.
166. Id. at 547.
167. See id. at 548.
168. Id. at 555 (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoner's Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119,
132 (1977)).
169. Id. at 555.
170. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
171. Bell, 441 U.S. at 546-47.
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day-to-day administration of a prison.1 71 Petitioners had argued that
the proper standard for the Court was the least restrictive means
standard. 73 The Supreme Court expressly rejected the least restric-
tive means standard when conditions were not alleged to infringe upon
a more specific guarantee than the fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess clause.' 74 When a prisoner's claim was based upon a violation
of due process alone, the Court in Bell held that courts should not
second-guess prison officials and should defer to their judgments.'75
The Court in Bell did not reject the least restrictive means test as
the proper test to be applied when prison conditions infringe upon
a right derived from a source more specific than the due process
clause 76 nor did the Court state what analysis should be used in that
situation. Accordingly, several federal decisions rendered subsequent
to Bell suggest that a higher level of judicial scrutiny is the appropriate
standard for reviewing specific constitutional claims.
B. Post-Bell Federal Cases
When a prison regulation offends a fundamental constitutional
guarantee, federal courts are not required to abdicate to correctional
officials the role of reviewing prison regulations.' 77 The United States
Supreme Court in Procunier v. Martinez 78 discussed the various stan-
dards of review applied by federal courts when constitutional viola-
tions were alleged by prisoners. 79 The Court held that the prison
regulation in question must further one or more of the substantial
governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation.' 8 In ad-
dition, the limitation must be no greater than is necessary for the
protection of the governmental interest involved.'8 ' This standard of
review, applied when prisoners allege that a regulation violates a
specific constitutional guarantee, remains intact despite the United
States Supreme Court decision of Bell v. Wolfish.'"
Courts faced with specific constitutional challenges to prison regula-
172. Id. at 547-48.
173. See id. at 530.
174. Id. at 533.
175. Id. at 547-48.
176. Id. at 533.
177. See infra notes 179-187 and accompanying text.
178. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
179. Id. at 406-07.
180. Id. at 413.
181. Id.
182. See infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
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tions have applied the Martinez test despite the Bell decision.I 3 Once
a prisoner proved a violation of a specific constitutional guarantee,
the burden shifted to prison administrators to establish the
reasonableness of the violation.' 84 A finding that the prison regula-
tion merely was reasonably related to an important state interest was
insufficient when fundamental rights were involved.' 85 The indepen-
dent role of the judiciary in litigation concerning conditions of con-
finement recently was reaffirmed in a federal case concerning the
California prison system.' 86 The court stated that no deference will
be given to prison officials who deprive prisoners of constitutional
rights.'87 California courts have followed federal cases applying a higher
level of review to allegations of specific constitutional violations.' 8
C. Judicial Review in California Courts
California has rejected the argument that Bell v. Wolfish precludes
the use of a strict scrutiny analysis when specific constitutional
guarantees are involved.'89 In a case decided after Bell, 90 the First
District Court of Appeals held that when institutional security as con-
templated by section 2600 of the Penal Code can be promoted by
several different means, the least restrictive of these means must be
chosen.' When fundamental constitutional rights are not implicated,
courts have exercised a lesser degree of judicial scrutiny.'92
In In re Price, 93 the California Supreme Court upheld a ban on
meetings of the Prisoners' Union imposed by the Department of
Corrections."' The court gave great deference to the findings and
opinions of the prison administrators.' 5 Once the court found that
the administrators' fears of potential security problems were reasonable,
183. O'Connor v. Keller, 510 F. Supp. 1359, 1368-69 (D. Md. 1981) (involving the con-
fiscation of legitimately possessed property); Salisbury v. List, 501 F. Supp. 105, 109 (D. Nev.
1980) (addressing a prisoner's right to marry).
184. O'Connor, 510 F. Supp. at 1368-69.
185. Salisbury, 501 F. Supp. at 109.
186. Toussaint v. Rushen, 553 F. Supp. 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 722 F.2d 1490 (9th
Cir. 1984).
187. 553 F. Supp. at 1378.
188. See infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
189. In re Parker, 151 Cal. App. 3d 583, 590, 198 Cal. Rptr. 796, 800 (1984).
190. In re Stone, 130 Cal. App. 3d 922, 182 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1982).
191. Id. at 929, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 83-84.
192. See Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 914, 553 P.2d 565, 570, 132 Cal. Rptr.
405, 410 (1976).
193. 25 Cal. 3d 448, 600 P.2d 1330, 158 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1979).
194. Price, 25 Cal. 3d at 454, 600 P.2d at 1333, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
195. Id. at 453-54, 600 P.2d at 1332-33, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76.
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the ban on meetings of the Prisoners' Union was upheld. 96 Prison
officials have argued that the standard in Price of deferring to prison
officials is the correct standard to be applied when prisoners claim
a prison regulation violates constitutional rights. 9 7 The holding in
Price, however, was premised upon a finding that the restriction did
not implicate any fundamental constitutional right. 98 Since constitu-
tional rights of prisoners were not violated by the regulation, the court
was not required to apply the strict scrutiny test. Price, therefore,
is authority for the proposition that when rights other than constitu-
tional rights are involved, courts may accord greater deference to the
judgment of prison administrators. After Price, the least restrictive
means test continued to be applied in cases in which fundamental
rights were implicated.
Two recent California cases illustrate the application of the least
restrictive means test. In In re Bell, 99 the First District Court of
Appeals was confronted with a restriction on a prisoner's right to
receive visitors."' 0 Visitation rights specifically are protected by statute
much like the rights involved in Arias.2 0 ' The court, interpreting sec-
tion 2600, held that the word necessary as used in the statute was
to be construed according to its common meaning.102 The court in
In re Bell stressed a two-part analysis. First, the reasonableness of
the warden's belief that institutional security was affected had to be
considered.20 3 The court in In re Bell found that the reasonableness
of the warden's concern regarding contraband in the prison was
self-evident .2 0  This determination, however, was only the first part
of the analysis. The second part of the analysis concerned the necessity
of the particular response chosen by the prison administration .2  The
court in Bell applied the least restrictive means test but since peti-
tioners failed to show that less restrictive alternatives existed, the
challenged regulation was upheld.06
In In re French, °' another case concerning personal visits, the First
196. Id.
197. Bell, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 821, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
198. Price, 25 Cal. 3d. at 453, 600 P.2d at 1332, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
199. 110 Cal. App. 3d 818, 168 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1980).
200. Id. at 820, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
201. See CAL. PEAL CODE §2601.
202. Bell, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 821-22, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 102. "A restriction... is not necessary
if the goal which it is intended to promote can effectively be promoted by less restrictive means."
Id.
203. Id. at 821, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 822, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
207. 106 Cal. App. 3d 74, 164 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1980).
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District Court of Appeals held that when a prison restriction violates
rights specifically enumerated by the legislature2"' a "counterweight ' 209
is presented to the purpose of the regulation. 20 Bell and French are
representative of the majority of California cases in which the strict
scrutiny standard of review has been applied when constitutional rights
of prisoners allegedly are violated. This standard is applied regardless
of whether the inmates are adults or juveniles.
JuDIcILu TREATMENT OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS
The analysis employed by the court in Arias deviated significantly
from the analysis accepted by California courts when fundamental
constitutional rights are implicated. 21 ' The result of the decision in
Arias is a potentially unconstitutional infringement of a prisoner's
fundamental rights. The cases relied upon by the Arias court concern
adult prisoners.2"2 Application of these cases to juveniles, however,
causes no analytical problems.21 3 The inmates at the CYA facility where
Arias was detained are youthful offenders who have been found guil-
ty of crimes in juvenile proceedings. 214 Prisoners in CYA custody are
confined involuntarily as are their adult counterparts .2 5 The freedom
of movement of a juvenile ward is restricted and wards are under
constant surveillance as are adult prisoners. Juvenile wards and adult
inmates, thus, share many common characteristics by virtue of their
confinement.
Penal Code section 2600 offers CYA wards the same protection
offered adult inmates. 1 6 The original version of section 2600 only
applied to adult prisoners, suspending all civil rights subject to some
discretion in correction officials.2"7 In 1968, the legislature amended
section 2600 to specify that all prisoners retained civil rights subject
to reasonable security concerns.2"'
Considerations of equal protection dictate that persons similarly
208. CAL. PENAL CODE §2601.
209. In re French, 106 Cal. App. 3d 74, 83, 164 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805-06 (1980).
210. Id.
211. See infra notes 224-46 and accompanying text.
212. Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 809 n.1, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 809 n.1.
213. Id.
214. M. PAULSON & C. WHrEBREAD, JuvEN E LAW AND PROCEDURE 32 (1974). See generally
Comment, Sending Juveniles To The California Youth Authority: The Need For Effective Proce-
dural Safeguards, 16 PAC. L.J. 1123 (1985).
215. Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 809 n.1, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 809 n.l.
216. See infra notes 218.20 and accompanying text.
217. DeLancie, 31 Cal. 3d at 871, 647 P.2d at 146, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
218. Id.
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situated must be treated similarly by the law.2 19 With respect to the
retention of constitutional rights, juveniles are similarly situated with
adult inmates and are entitled to no fewer rights.22 Therefore, inter-
pretations of Penal Code section 2600 have been applied to both adult
and juvenile cases. 22' Federal courts have recognized that children,
as well as adults, have substantial liberty interests. 222 These interests
have been held to be protected by the same language and rationale
codified in section 2600.223 Having established that California courts
apply the least restrictive means test when prisoners contend that
specific constitutional rights have been violated, the Arias opinion
now may be analyzed more fully.
ANALYSIS OF THE Arias OPINION
In applying the least restrictive means test, courts consistently have
held that the burden of justifying a prison regulation is upon prison
officials once a prisoner's fundamental rights are implicated. 24 The
cases have required prison officials to produce evidence that consists
of more than just an opinion of necessity to satisfy this burden.2"
In In re Stone,226 the First District Court of Appeals seriously con-
sidered the views of prison officials and noted that the officials should
be entitled to a certain degree of flexibility when taking effective
action. 227 Despite this consideration, the court invalidated the challenged
regulation. 22 The court found that the warden primarily had relied
upon his own opinions, conclusions, and speculations.229 In the view
of the court, the warden's opinion simply was not enough to sustain
the burden of proving that the regulation was necessary.230 Prison
officials have attempted to justify regulations in general terms as
necessary to maintain institutional security.23' Courts have held that
219. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 586 (2d ed. 1983).
220. Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 809 n.1, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 809 n.l.
221. Id.
222. Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 943 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. den., 103 S. Ct. 1524
(1983).
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 687, 470 P.2d 640, 647, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504,
511 (1970).
225. See, e.g., People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 719, 394 P.2d 813, 815, 40 Cal. Rptr.
69, 71 (1964).
226. 130 Cal. App. 3d 922, 182 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1982).
227. Id. at 930, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. In re Reynolds, 25 Cal. 3d 131, 134, 599 P.2d 86, 88, 157 Cal. Rptr. 892, 894 (1979).
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these generalized assertions do not constitute sufficient evidence to
sustain the burden of the state.232
An analysis of the way in which the Arias court allocated the burden
of justification, as well as the evidence the court admitted to sustain
that burden, conflicts with the aforementioned case law.2 33 The Arias
court stated that the burden of proving necessity was not on prison
officials."' This statement is in direct conflict with prior authority
that places the burden of justifying the regulation on prison officials."'
The Arias court further stated that prison officials only had to pro-
duce evidence that a potential danger to institutional security would
be presented by permitting petitioners to exercise certain constitutional
rights. 236 The court explained that testimony by the responsible of-
ficials would be sufficient if those opinions were held sincerely.237 This
opinion evidence represents the kind of "wholly speculative
predictions ' 2 38 and "untested assertions ' 2 39 that other California courts
had found unacceptable. 20 The Arias court dismissed as irrelevant
petitioner's argument that there had never been an incident of violence
in the chapel.2"' This same factor, however, was dispositive in In Re
Reynolds2 2 in which the court struck down a prison regulation pro-
hibiting prisoners from wearing a Prisoners' Union button.243 The court
found that the prison officials had alleged neither past disruption nor
specific reasons for predicting future disruption. 24 The Arias court
concluded that the state had met the burden of going forward with
the evidence, and that, therefore, the court must defer to the judg-
ment of the prison officials.2"5 The court was following the standard
of review requiring that great deference be given to prison ad-
ministrators as set forth in Bell v. Wolfish. 2"
This author suggests that the Arias court should have invoked the
least restrictive means test 24 7 and should have required a stronger show-
232. Id. at 134-35, 599 P.2d at 88, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
233. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
234. Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 811, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
235. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
236. Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 811, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
237. Id.
238. In re Jordan, 7 Cal. 3d. 930, 937, 500 P.2d 873, 876, 103 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1972).
239. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 724, 394 P.2d at 819, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
240. See supra note 229-32 and accompanying text.
241. Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 812, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
242. 25 Cal. 3d 131, 599 P.2d 86, 157 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1979).
243. Reynolds, 25 Cal. 3d at 133, 599 P.2d at 87, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
244. Id. at 134, 599 P.2d at 88, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
245. Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 811, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
246. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
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ing of evidence to sustain the burden that initially should have been
placed on the prison administration.'" If the least restrictive means
test had been used the court would have found that less restrictive
alternatives were available. The system in use prior to installation of
the sound system in question consisted of FM beepers which were
carried by security personnel. 2 9 The court found this monitoring system
inadequate for three reasons. First, the beepers had to be activated
manually by the wearer, 250 hence they were ineffective if the wearer
for some reason could not activate the alarm.25' Second, the beepers
did not permit two-way communication.252 Once the beeper was ac-
tivated, security personnel were aware that a problem existed, but
had no way of discovering the nature or severity of the problem.5 3
Third, because the beepers were provided only to the staff, inmates
were unprotected unless a staff member was present and aware of
the disturbance. 25 The court in Arias held that no equally effective
alternatives to the sound system existed. 25 1 Testimony in respondent's
own brief suggested other monitoring systems were available which
addressed each concern. 256 An electronic specialist testified that a wide
range of FM type alarms existed that transmit sound.257 Using these
alarms, security control personnel would be able to hear the nature
of any disturbance after the alarm had been activated. 28 These systems
would be less intrusive than a system that allowed continual sound
surveillance, and would be just as effective. The alternative FM beepers
also are activated when moved into a horizontal position. 2 9 Thus,
if a staff member was knocked to the ground, the alarm would be
activated automatically. 260 Finally, with regard to the concern of the
court that the wards were unprotected in the absence of a guard,
testimony was offered that no one was inside the chapel area without
a staff member.26'
248. See supra notes 224-32 and accompanying text.
249. Arias, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 811, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 812, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
256. Respondent's Return To Order To Show Cause at 25, In re Arias, 160 Cal. App.
3d 804, 206 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1984).
257. Id.'
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Petitioner's Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus at 2, In re Arias, 160 Cal. App.
3d 804, 206 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1984).
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The above discussion suggests that less restrictive alternatives to
the proposed sound monitoring device in the chapel may have ex-
isted. Since the proposed system violated petitioner's fundamental con-
stitutional right to privacy, the court should have applied the least
restrictive means test to consider alternative systems. The failure of
the court in Arias to analyze the alternative systems led to an imper-
missible violation of petitioner's right to privacy.
CONCLUSION
When the fundamental rights of a juvenile inmate are violated by
a prison regulation, the court should utilize a strict scrutiny level of
review. The court should require that the regulation be the least restric-
tive alternative available. This level of review best reflects the posi-
tion of the legislature that inmates are entitled to the same constitu-
tional protection as non-inmates, subject only to restrictions necessary
for the security of the institution and the protection of the public.
The legislature has not been specific regarding the rights retained
by prisoners and the extent upon which these rights may be infring-
ed. Penal Code section 2600 states that prisoners may suffer some
infringements of their rights by virtue of confinement. Penal Code
section 636 codifies several absolute privileges based upon certain
special relationships including the penitent-clergy relationship.In ad-
dition, prisoners retain constitutional rights. A finding that a viola-
tion under either the United States or California Constitutions has
occurred requires the court to decide whether that violation is per-
missible in light of the goals and interests involved.
The scope of judicial review exercised by the court is directly related
to the nature of the rights involved. Although not all courts are in
agreement, the great weight of California authority suggests that the
least restrictive means test should apply to determine whether a regula-
tion that impinges upon fundamental constitutional rights is valid.
A judicial finding that the interest of the prison administration could
be promoted in a less intrusive manner requires the court to invalidate
the regulation.
In re Arias concerned fundamental constitutional rights of prisoners
infringed upon by the installation of a sound monitoring surveillance
system in a prison chapel. The appropriate standard of judicial review
is the strict scrutiny test. The Arias court, therefore, erred in apply-
ing a lesser standard. Had the court employed the stricter test, a less
restrictive alternative would have been discovered. The use of the sound
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system in In re Arias, therefore, unconstitutionally violated the peti-
tioner's rights and should have been declared unconstitutional.
Mona Halprin
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